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A Comparative Look at the Reporter's Privilege 
in Criminal Cases: United States, Federal 
Republic of Germany, and Switzerland 
The reporter's privilege allows journalists to withhold the 
identity of news sources during investigatory proceedings.' This 
controversial privilege has received considerable attention from 
legislative bodies, courts and scholars in the United States, the 
Federal Republic of germ an^,^ and Switzerland. Unique na- 
tional ideas of the press and its role have caused each of these 
countries to reach different conclusions about granting a re- 
porter's privilege. 
The major developments involving the reporter's privilege 
in the United States, West Germany, and Switzerland occurred 
approximately ten years ago. However, questions about the exis- 
tence and scope of the privilege have continued to trouble the 
lower courts and scholars of each country. This comment com- 
pares the availability of the reporter's privilege in criminal ac- 
tions in the three countries and examines the structural and ide- 
ological developments leading to the enactment of their present 
laws.3 
A reporter in the United States has little protection against 
judicially compelled disclosure of the identity of his sources in a 
criminal prosecution because there is no federal statutory or ju- 
1. The terms reporter's privilege and Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht (the German term) 
are used in civil, administrative, and criminal proceedings. However, this comment dis- 
cusses only the criminal procedure aspect. The reporter's privilege is not limited to re- 
porters. The term is used here to refer to all those working in the news media who are 
accorded privileges by statutes and judicial decisions. (Translations of all German mater- 
ials are the author's.) 
2. The Federal Republic of Germany will hereinafter be referred to as West 
Germany. 
3. Much of the discussion about the present state of the law will center around 
landmark judicial decisions. The use of judicial decisions to explain the approaches of 
the various countries is not intended to emphasize the importance of the judiciary in 
formulating the reporter's privilege. The role of the judiciary has varied in the different 
countries, but the court opinions can serve as official statements about the reporter's 
privilege in the various legal systems. 
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dicially recognized reporter's pri~ilege.~ Congress has considered 
reporter's privilege' legislation several times, but has never 
adopted a federal reporter's privilege ~ t a t u t e . ~  The judiciary has 
been hindered in developing a common law reporter's privilege 
by Branzburg u. ha ye^,^ a 1972 Supreme Court decision holding 
that there is no constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege. 
Branzburg u. Hayes is the only Supreme Court decision that 
discusses the reporter's pri~ilege.~ In Branzburg, the Court con- 
sidered the appeals of three journalists who had been subpoe- 
naed by grand juries to answer questions concerning the journal- 
ists' reports on certain criminal activities. On three occasions the 
journalists refused to appear before the grand juries. On two 
other occasions the journalists appeared, but refused to answer 
questions relating to the identity of their sources after claiming 
a reporter's privilege under the first amendment.s The Court re- 
jected the journalists' argument and held that requiring journal- 
ists to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries 
does not abridge the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by 
the first amendment.9 
4. See generally Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L 
REV. 229 (1971); D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential 
Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J .  ON LEGIS. 307 (1969); Eckhardt & McKey, Reporter's 
Privilege: An Update, 12 CONN. L. REV. 435 (1980); Edelstein & LoBue, Journalist's 
Priuilege and the Criminal Defendant, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 913 (1979); Guest & Stan- 
zler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 18 (1969); Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 
TEX. L. REV. 829 (1974); Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confi- 
dential Sources and Information, 24 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1971); Note, Reporter's and 
Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 
317 (1970). 
5. See, eg . ,  Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 
750, S. 870, S. 917, S.  1128 and S.J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Newsmen's 
Privilege; Hearing on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 
n.28 (1972). 
6. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
7. The only other time the entire Court has considered similar issues was in Zurcher 
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), which involved the search and seizure of news- 
room materials.~Individual justices have, on occasion, stated opinions on reporter's privi- 
lege. See, e g . ,  In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers). 
8. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at  667-78. This was not the first time a first amendment 
claim had been made. However, such claims have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., 
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Good- 
fader, 45 Hawaii 317,367 P.2d 472 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244,436 P.2d 729, 
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963). 
9. Branzburg, 408 U.S. a t  667. 
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Justice White's plurality opinion noted that "[tlhe heart of 
the claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting from 
compelling reporters to disclose confidential information out- 
weighs any public interest in obtaining the information."1•‹ The 
Court weighed the importance of "the right to every man's evi- 
dence,"" especially in criminal grand jury proceedings, against 
the possible harm to a journalist's ability to gather news, and 
found the evidentiary interest more compelling.'* Although 
newsgathering does qualify for first amendment protection, the 
Court held that journalists are afforded no greater protection 
than the average citizen.13 The Court particularly emphasized 
that "[flrom the beginning of our country the press has operated 
without constitutional protection for press informants, and the 
press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not 
been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of 
confidential news sources by the press."14 
The Court did not grant journalists a conditional first 
amendment privilege because of the difficulty in (1) defining the 
terms and scope of the privilege, (2) distinguishing between dif- 
ferent crimes, and (3) providing journalists with a reliable rule.15 
According to the Court, the Constitution offers protection only 
when grand jury investigations are undertaken in bad faith to 
harass and "disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news 
s ~ u r c e s . " ~ ~  
Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion articulated a less 
rigorous standard that has been applied by many courts to limit 
the impact of Branzburg. Justice Powell stated the rule: 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by 
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press 
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony 
with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital 
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis ac- 
10. Id .  at 681. 
11. Id .  at 688 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, VIDENCE 5 2192 (rev. ed. 1961)). 
12. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690. In considering the possible negative effects of com- 
pelled disclosure of the source's identity, the Court looked at articles by Blasi and Guest 
& Stanzler that contained surveys and empirical studies of the use of confidential infor- 
mation by journalists. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694 nn.32 & 33. Some commentators feel 
the Court misread the data in favor of its finding. See, e.g., Murasky, supra note 4. 
13. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-85. 
14. Id.  at 698-99. 
15. Id.  at 702-04. 
16. Id.  at 707-08. 
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cords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such 
questions." 
Courts have used the Powell approach to limit Branzburg to its 
facts. However, no common law reporter's privilege has been 
granted in criminal proceedings unless the investigation was un- 
dertaken in bad faith to harass the reporter or state statutory 
provisions specifically granted the privilege.ls 
Although the Branzburg decision has been uniformly criti- 
cized, neither the Court nor Congress has been persuaded to 
grant a reporter's privilege in criminal cases.lS However, the 
Court in Branzburg did recognize that state statutes may pro- 
vide for a reporter's privilege.20 At the time Branzburg was de- 
cided nineteen states accorded some form of statutory reporter's 
p r i ~ i l e g e . ~ ~  Today twenty-five states have reporter privilege stat- 
utes that grant varying degrees of privilege.22 However, despite 
17. Id. at 710 (emphasis added). 
18. See S. METCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND RE- 
PORTERS •˜ 3.09 (1982). 
19. The principles of the Branzburg decision appear to have been reinforced by 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). Nonetheless, Justice Brennan stated in 
In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1980) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers), that he did 
"not believe that the Court has foreclosed news reporters from resisting a subpoena on 
First Amendment grounds." 
20. 408 US.  a t  688-89. 
21. See Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitu- 
tional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299,304-08 
(1979). 
22. ALA. CODE •˜ 12-21-142 (1977) (absolute privilege as to identity of source); 
ALASKA STAT. •˜• ˜  09.25.150-.220 (1983) (qualified privilege); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 12- 
2237 (1982) (absolute privilege as to identity of source); ARK. STAT. ANN. 3 43-917 (1977) 
(must be an initial showing of publication with malice to require disclosure); CAL. EVID. 
CODE 3 1070(a) (West Supp. 1984) (only protects newsmen from contempt); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, •˜• ˜  4320-4326 (1974) (qualified privilege); IND. CODE ANN. 34-3-5-1 (Burns 
Supp. 1983) (limited to identity of source); KY. REV. STAT. ANN 3 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 
1970) (directed only to identity of source of published information); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
45:1451-1454 (West 1982) (qualified privilege); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 9- 
112 (1984) (absolute privilege as to the identity of sources); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. •˜ 
767.5a (West 1982) (absolute privilege); MINN. STAT. ANN $3 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 
1984) (qualified privilege); MONT. CODE ANN. $3 26-1-901 to -903 (1983) (absolute privi- 
lege); NEB. REV. STAT. •˜• ˜  20-144 to -147 (1977) (absolute privilege); NEV. REV. STAT. $ 
49.275 (1981) (absolute privilege); N.J. STAT. ANN. •˜ 2A:84A-21, -21a, -21.1 to -21.9 (West 
Supp. 1983-84) (qualified privilege); N.M. STAT. ANN. •˜ 38-6-7 (Supp. 1983) (privilege 
does not apply to judicial proceedings: Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 
N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976)); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW •˜ 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1983- 
84) (absolute privilege); N.D. CENT. CODE $ 31-01-06.2 (1976) (qualified privilege); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. 2739.04, .12 (Page 1981 & Supp. 1984) (protects only identity of 
source: State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 441 N.E.2d 803 (1981)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12, 2506 (West 1980) (limited privilege); OR. REV. STAT. $8 44.510-.540 (1981) (limited 
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the existence of numerous state reporter's privilege statutes, the 
judiciary has continued to restrict the privilege in criminal 
Thus, a reporter in the United States has little protection 
against being compelled to disclose the identity of sources. The 
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, which held that there is 
no constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege, has limited ju- 
dicial development of the reporter's privilege to a case by case 
balancing of law enforcement interests against the function of 
- 
the press. Law enforcement interests have predominated. There- 
fore, Congress's failure to enact a federal reporter's privilege 
statute has left reporters dependent on state laws that often do 
not provide adequate protection in criminal cases. 
The reporter's privilege has also been the subject of consid- 
erable discussion in West Germany26 because of legislation 
privilege); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3 5942 (Purdon 1982) (broad protection); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS $8 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1983) (qualified privilege); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 24-1-208 
(1980) (qualified privilege). A characterization of the statutes is found in S. METCALF, 
supra note 18, a t  3 3.02. 
23. See, eg., H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND 
CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA 372-75 (4th ed. 1982). Reporters who have 
personally witnessed a crime, as had two of the journalists in Branzburg, do not appear 
to be eligible to claim a reporter's privilege. Id. 
24. In German the term used to describe the reporter's privilege is 
Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht. 
25. See, eg., P. CRAMER, DAS ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT VON PRESSE UND 
RUNDFUNK (1968); L. HENNEMANN, PRESSEFRE~HE~T UND ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT 
(Berliner Abhandlung zum Presserecht Heft 23, 1978); H. HUPPERTZ, ZEUGNIS- 
VERWEIGERUNGSRECHT, BESCHLAGNAHME- UND DURCHSUCHUNGSVERBOT ZUGUNSTEN DES 
RUNDFUNKS IM STRAFPROZESS (Instituts fiir Rundfunkrecht an der Universitat zu Koln 
Band 8, 1971); U KLUG. PRESSESCHUTZ IM STRAFPROZESS. EIN RECHTSGUTACHTEN IM 
"SPIEGEL" -VERFAHREN (1965); Gross, Zum Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht der Mitarbeiter 
uon Presse und Rundfunk, in FESTSCHRIFT UR GERHARD SCHIEDERMAIR ZUM 70. GEBURT- 
STAG 223 (1976); Gross, Neuregelung des journalistischen Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht, 
1975 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [N.J.W.] 1763; Kaiser, Die Verfassungsmas- 
sigkeit des Zeugnisoerweigerungsrechts der Presse, 1968 N.J.W. 1260; Kohlhaas, Das 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht der Journalisten, in PRESSERECHT UND PRESSEFREIHEIT: 
FESTSCHRIFT FUR MARTIN LOFFLER ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG 143 (1980); Kunert, Das Gesetz 
iiber das Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht der Mitarbeiter oon Presse und Rundfunk, 1975 
MONATSSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES RECHT 885; Loffler, Liicken und Mange1 irn neuen 
Zeugnisoerweigerungs- und Beschlagnahmerecht oon Presse und Rundfunk, 1978 
N.J.W. 913; Rengier, Die Reichweite des •˜ 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 StPO zum Schutze des na- 
mentlich preisgegebenen, aber unaufindbaren Informanten, 1979 JURISTENZEITUNG 
[J.Z.] 797; Van Gelder, Die Verfassungswidrigkeit des landespresserechtlichen Zeugnis- 
uerweigerungsrechte, 1969 J.Z. 698; Note, Das Neue Zeugnisuerweigerungs- und 
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passed by the German Bundestag (parliament). Of the three 
countries considered in this comment, West Germany is the only 
one that has a federal statutory reporter's privilege. 
The origin of the West German reporter's privilege statute 
can be traced to statutes enacted in 1868 by three of the Ger- 
man Lander (states).26 These first statutes were enacted in re- 
sponse to the Prussian government's failure to pass a similar law 
that would have applied to all the German Lander controlled by 
Prussia. A federal reporter's privilege statute was not enacted 
until 1926, even though the unified German Reichstag had first 
considered passing such a federal law in 1874.27 By 1965, the 
federal reporter's privilege statute stated: 
Editors, publishers, distributors, printers and others who have 
worked in the production or publication of a periodic publica- 
tion [are permitted to withhold testimony] about the identity 
of an author, source or informant of a publication of punisha- 
ble contents, when an editor of the publication is punished or 
nothing prohibits his puni~hment .~~  
This formulation of the law gave reporters little protection 
from compelled disclosure for four reasons. First, there was no 
privilege for reporters who were not directly involved in the pro- 
duction or publication of a p e r i ~ d i c a l . ~ ~  This left many reporters, 
especially free-lance reporters, without protection. Second, even 
reporters granted the privilege could not withhold the identity 
of their sources unless their editor would be liable under the law 
if the material were published. A reporter's sources were pro- 
tected if an article was false or libelous, but not if the article was 
accurate. Consequently, only unreliable informants, whose infor- 
mation is of little value to society, were protected under the 
law.30 Third, the privilege did not arise until the information 
Beschlagnahmerecht im Presse und Rundfunkbereich, 1978 N.J.W. 1617; Note, Die 
Verfassungsmiissigkeit des Zeugnisuerweigerungsrechts der Presse, 1968 N.J.W. 2368. 
26. H. M ~ H L ,  DAS ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT DER PRESSE IM STRAF- UND DIS- 
ZIPLINARVERFAHREN 23-24 (Zeitungs-Verlag und Zeitschriften-Verlag Band 2, 1963). 
27. Id. at 25-26, 34. The federal law was not applied to the broadcast media until 
1953. Id. at 39-42. 
28. Strafprozessordnung [STPO] 1 53(1)(5), 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 1374 
(W. Ger.). Because this law was contained in the criminal procedure code it was only 
applicable to criminal procedure. Other statutes exist for other types of procedure. Pun- 
ishment in this context would apparently be for violation of the press laws. See generally 
H. MBHL, supra note 26, at 60-74. 
29. See L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, at 18. 
30. See P. CRAMER, supra note 25, at 19; L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, at 16; U. 
KLUG, supra note 25, at 21. 
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supplied by the informant was published. Thus, authorities 
could compel disclosure before publication, even if the material 
was subsequently p ~ b l i s h e d . ~ ~  Fourth, only the name of the 
source could be withheld. Information about the location of the 
informant had to be revealed even though such information 
might easily lead to the identification of the protected source.32 
In response to this weak federal statutory privilege, by 1966 
every West German Land had adopted a reporter's privilege 
statute. These state statutes appeared to grant journalists a 
broader privilege.33 However, the scope of the state statutory 
privilege was unclear because of differences between the state 
statutes.34 This confusion, combined with decisions by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) and a 
vast amount of scholarly work condemning the existing privilege, 
eventually persuaded the Bundestag to enact a more inclusive 
and comprehensible statute. 
The first decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht that en- 
couraged the enactment of a new federal statute was the Spiegel 
decision in 1966.35 Spiegel primarily involved the search and 
seizure of editorial material from a German magazine, but the 
opinion also discussed the federal reporter's p r i ~ i l e g e . ~ ~  The 
court stated that the federal reporter's privilege statute was con- 
stitutional and partially protected editorial secrecy. However, 
since the statute was not comprehensive, the court had to bal- 
ance editorial secrecy against law enforcement interests, giving 
editorial secrecy as much weight as possible until a new federal 
statute could be ena~ted.~ '  
The need for a new federal statute was underscored again in 
31. See R. GROSS. GRUNDZUECE DES DEUTSCHEN PRESSERECHTS 146 (1969). But see P. 
SCHNEIDER, PRESSEPREIHEIT UND STAATSSICHERHEIT 166. See generally L. HENNEMANN, 
supra note 25, at 17. 
32. L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, at 17. 
33. See, e.g., id. at 25-26; 1 LOWE-ROSENBERC, DIESTRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS 
GER~CHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR •˜ 53 ll37 (23d ed. 1976); see also Judg- 
ment of Aug. 5, 1966, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 20 Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] 162, 189. 
34. L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, at 24. 
35. Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 20 BVerfG 162, 
189 [hereinafter cited as Spiegel]. 
36. West Germany has a separate statute according protection against searches and 
seizures of media material in criminal procedure. It is codified under STPO 8 97(5). The 
federal reporter's privilege in criminal procedure discussed above and mentioned by the 
Court is codified at STPO 1 53(1)(5). 
37. Spiegel, supra note 35, at 189. 
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1973 when the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the reporter's 
privilege statutes of two Lander, Hesse and Hamburg, were un- 
constitutional in criminal actions.38 The court held that because 
the federal government had already enacted legislation in the 
area, articles 72 and 74 of the West German Basic Law (consti- 
tution) did not give the Lander power to promulgate criminal 
procedure laws.39 In dicta, the court also stated that a privilege 
to withhold testimony did not flow directly from the freedom of 
the press clause in the Basic Law.4o 
In 1975 the Bundestag enacted a new federal reporter's 
privilege statute applicable to criminal proceedings. The statute 
states: 
Persons, who in their profession participate or have partici- 
pated in the preparation, production or distribution of a peri- 
odic publication or broadcast [are permitted to refuse to tes- 
tify] about the identity of an author or source of contributions 
or documents, as well as about the statements made by them 
about their activity, to the extent that it concerns contribu- 
tions, documents and statements for the editorial portion [of 
the publication or b r ~ a d c a s t ] . ~ ~  
In a 1978 decision, the Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen (the 
highest West German federal court for criminal matters) dis- 
cussed the new statute and noted that it eliminated three of the 
limitations found in t h e  previous reporter's privilege statute.42 
First, no violation of the press laws was required. Second, the 
editor did not have to be personally liable under the new law 
38. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 36 BVerfG 193 
[hereinafter cited as Hesse]; Judgment of Feb. 13, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. 
Ger., 36 BVerfG 314 [hereinafter cited as Hamburg]. 
39. Hesse, supra note 38, a t  317. Among other rules, GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 72(1), 
74(1) (W. Ger.) provide that the states have power to promulgate criminally and judi- 
cally related laws only if there are no conflicting federal laws. STPO 1 53(1)(5), the fed- 
eral reporter's privilege statute, was a criminal procedure statute, thus making the state 
legislation unconstitutional. See also Spiegel, supra note 35, a t  202. 
40. Hamburg, supra note 38, a t  317. This dicta was a response to the theory, pro- 
posed by numerous scholars, that a reporter's privilege could be derived from the Basic 
Law. See, e.g., P. CRAMER, supra note 25, a t  36 ff.; R. GROSS, supra note 31, a t  152; U. 
KLUG, supra note 25, a t  52-66; H. MBHL, supra note 26, a t  103; Kaiser, supra note 25; 
Note, 1968 N.J.W. 2368. Some of the speculation appears to have been fostered by the 
language of the Spiegel decision that appeared to indicate the privilege could be derived 
directly from the Basic Law. Spiegel, supra note 35, a t  176. 
41. STPO 8 53(1)(5), 1975 BGBl I 1973 (W. Ger.). 
42. Judgment of Dec. 28, 1978, B~ndes~erichtshof in Strafsachen, W. Ger., 28 
Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 240, 245-246 (hereinafter cited as 
Frankfurt]. 
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before the privilege attached. And third, identifying information, 
as well as the identity of the reporter's source could be withheld. 
The court stated that the new statutory privilege was intended 
to be "friendly to the press."43 I t  is an absolute privilege because 
there are no exceptions that relate to the type of crime involved. 
However, the statute does not protect journalists who have per- 
sonally witnessed criminal activity.'* Additionally, after a jour- 
nalist has revealed some information about the identity of the 
informant, the statute no longer provides automatic p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Instead, the court must weigh the competing law enforcement 
and confidentiality interests to determine if the privilege should 
be granted. The privilege will be extended only when (1) the in- 
terest in maintaining confidentiality clearly outweighs the inter- 
est in criminal justice, and (2) an "extraordinary publicity inter- 
est" is involved.46 The court also indicated that, although the 
new law approaches the constitutional limits of the reporter's 
privilege, the Bundestag's formulation must be respected be- 
cause of the judicial principle: "When in doubt decide in favor of 
the freedom of the press."47 
The new "absolute" reporter's privilege is not perfect. The 
most prominent problem that remains is identifying persons 
who qualify for the privilege. The statute requires a journalist to 
participate by profession in the publication or broadcast media 
in order to qualify for protection." Commentators have postu- 
lated that this wording will continue to deny the privilege to 
43. Id. at  247. 
44. Id. at  247-48, 253. 
45. Id. at  244-45. 
46. Id. at  248-49. This standard appears to give courts discretion, but with emphasis 
on the criminal prosecution interest. The court described an extraordinary publicity in- 
terest as being when, a t  least a t  the time of decision, the publication of the article serves 
in the general interest to protect especially major rights and when the publication is an 
appropriate means to protect those rights. Id. at  249. This explanation offers little help 
in understanding what an extraordinary publicity interest is. However, in the case before 
it the court decided that a judicially granted privilege was not appropriate. The case 
involved an article based on an interview with a person who was purported to have par- 
ticipated in a mass murder. The article pointed out that the source, still unknown to 
authorities, was a "Frankfurt chap". The court held that the statutory privilege had been 
waived by this disclosure, and the crime involved weighed against a judicially granted 
privilege. The strictness of this holding has been criticized. See, e.g., Rengier, Die 
Reichweite des J 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 StPO zum Schutze des namentlich preisgegebenen, 
aber unaufindbaren Informanten, 1979 J.Z. 797. 
47. Frankfurt, supra note 42, a t  248. See generally Judgment of May 10, 1983, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 1984 EUROPXISCHE GRUNDRECHTE Z ITSCHRIFT 
[EuCRZ] 90 (explanation of the extent of a constitutionally based reporter's privilege). 
48. The German word used in the statute is berufsmiissig. 
440 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
part-time and free-lance journalists.4s A second problem is that 
only those who work on a periodic publication or broadcast are 
granted the privilege. Scholars have contended that the term 
"periodic" is too r e s t r i c t i~e .~~  The term appears to exclude those 
involved in publishing a book based on research done for a peri- 
odical publication, documentary filmmakers, and possibly 
others. However, despite its defects, the new reporter's privilege 
statute gives West German reporters a solid and broad basis for 
protecting confidential sources. 
In Switzerland the reporter's privilege has not received the 
same amount of attention it has in West Germany. Unlike the 
West German Bundestag, the Swiss Bundesversammlung (Fed- 
eral Assembly) has refused to grant a federal reporter's privilege. 
Therefore, much as in the United States, the fate of the privi- 
lege has been left to the individual cantons (the Swiss equivalent 
of states). Some of the Swiss cantons have enacted reporter's 
privilege statutes. However, for purposes of comparison, this sec- 
tion will focus on the canton of Zurich which does not recognize 
the reporter's pri~ilege.~' 
In 1972, the case of Danuser v. Bezirksanwaltschaft Zii- 
rich" came before the highest federal court in Switzerland. Sev- 
eral juveniles who had escaped from a reformatory were inter- 
viewed on television while their whereabouts were unknown to 
law enforcement authorities. The show's producer was ques- 
tioned by the authorities regarding the location of the juveniles, 
but he refused to answer.b3 Although the canton had not enacted 
a statutory reporter's privilege, the producer claimed a privilege 
derived directly from the freedom of the press clause of the 
49. See, e.g., L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, a t  48-50; Liiffler, supra note 25, a t  913- 
14. 
50. See, e.g., Loffler, supra note 25, at  913-14. 
51. Zurich is emphasized for two reasons. First, the Zurich canton is dealt with in 
the major decision by the highest national court and other informative decisions involv- 
ing reporter's privilege. Second, the purpose for including the Swiss system in this com- 
ment is to compare and contrast how systems with almost identical backgrounds can 
reach totally different results. Zurich, one of the cantons to deny reporter's privilege, is a 
good tool for comparison and contrast. 
52. Judgment of June 28, 1972, Bundesgericht, Switz., 98 Entscheidungen des 
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung [BC] I 418 [hereinafter cited as 
Danuser]. 
53. Id. a t  420. 
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Swiss con~titution.~' The court rejected the producer's claim for 
a reporter's privilege by relying on section 128 of the Zuricher 
Strafprozessordung (Zurich Criminal Procedure Code), which re- 
quires full disclosure, with limited exceptions, to investigating 
authorities. The court held that the producer had to disclose the 
whereabouts of the youths. 
A general reporter's privilege cannot be derived from either the 
freedom of the press or freedom of expression because the 
guaranteed basic rights are not directly affected by the obliga- 
tion to testify. Whether the journalistic worth of anonymous 
informants is of greater importance than the clarification of 
particular fact situations so that the anonymity of the inform- 
ant should be preserved in criminal proceedings, is a question 
whose solution cannot be derived from the constitution, but 
rather should be handled by the proper legi~lature."~ 
The court concluded that because neither the Zurich Criminal 
Procedure Code nor the federal code contained a reporter's priv- 
ilege, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and 
freedom of expression were not violated by requiring the pro- 
ducer to answer questions about the youths.56 The court reaf- 
firmed this holding in another case in 1981.b7 
The Zuricher Obergericht in Strafkammer (Zurich Superior 
Criminal Court) also confronted the reporter's privilege issue in 
a case involving the seizure of photocopies of arrest warrants 
from a newsroom.b8 Although seizure rather than nondisclosure 
of the identity of news sources was involved, the court discussed 
the reporter's privilege in detail. First, the court reiterated much 
of the Danuser decision and pointed out that only doctors, law- 
yers, and clergy have the privilege not to testify. The court ad- 
mitted that the confidential relationship between the press and 
informants was protected by the freedom of the press clause, but 
held that the Swiss Constitution does not provide an unlimited 
p r i ~ i l e g e . ~ ~  Freedom of the press is only a part of the general 
freedom of expression that is granted to all citizens and cannot 
be used to avoid obligations that are common to all citizens. 
54. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BVERF] art. 55 (Switz.). 
55. Danuser, supra note 52, at 422 (emphasis added). 
56. Id.  
57. Judgment of July 1, 1981, Bundesgericht, Switz., 1982 EuGRZ 29. 
58. Judgment of Sept. 4, 1979, Obergericht in Strafkammer, Zurich, Switz., 76 
SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 317 [hereinafter cited as Zurich]. 
59. Id .  at 320. 
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Only the legislature can sanction withholding the identity of 
news sources in criminal  investigation^.'^ As a result, the court 
held that reporters have no greater constitutional protection 
from testifying than nonreporters. 
The court did acknowledge that the confidentiality between 
informant and reporter cannot be totally disregarded. Under 
some circumstances the relationship may be considered by the 
court, but the anonymity of sources does not require any special 
prote~tion.~' The court stated: "The press in Switzerland sur- 
vived up until now without a statutory privilege. Despite that, or 
perhaps because of that, the press has prevailed in its important 
a~signment ."~~ The defendant, citing a West German case as au- 
t h ~ r i t y , ~ ~  urged the court to balance the interest in the collection 
of the news against the interest in prosecution in deciding 
whether to grant a reporter's privilege. However, even after con- 
sidering the role of the press the court found that (1) the crimi- 
nal offense involved in the case was no less important than the 
reporter's privilege, and (2) no extraordinary interest in publica- 
tion was present in the case.64 
As this case illustrates, the Swiss have relied on the legisla- 
ture to decide whether or not to grant a reporter's privilege. The 
Swiss constitution does not expressly grant a reporter's privilege 
and the courts in the canton of Zurich have been unwilling to 
interpret the constitution or criminal code as requiring a privi- 
lege. With few cantonal reporter's privileges and no uniform fed- 
eral reporter's privilege, the reporter's position in Switzerland 
remains precarious. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
The federal reporter's privilege accorded the press in West 
Germany is vastly different from that found in the United 
States and Switzerland. In West Germany, journalists for peri- 
odic publications and broadcasts have an absolute privilege to 
protect their sources without regard to the seriousness of the 
crime involved. In contrast, in the United States and Switzer- 
land, although some states and cantons have enacted reporter's 
60. Id.  
61. Id.  To emphasize its point, the court stated that a source should not expect his 
identity to be protected. 
62. Id.  
63. The German case referred to is apparently Frankfurt, supra note 42. 
64. Zurich, supra note 58, at 320-21. 
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privilege statutes, reporters in over half of the states and can- 
tons have no significant privilege to withhold testimony in crimi- 
nal proceedings. This difference is a result of the unique consti- 
tutional and philosophical theories of the three countries. 
A. Constitutional Analysis 
Journalists in all three countries claim a reporter's privilege 
derived directly from a constitutional freedom of the press 
clause.s6 The journalists' argument is based on two premises. 
First, the press has a constitutionally granted function to inform 
the public and stimulate public opinion. Second, a reporter's 
privilege is necessary to carry out the press function. Journalists 
argue that, without a reporter's privilege, sources are hesitant to 
inform and consequently the function of the press is inhibited. 
The journalists' first premise has been accepted in all three 
countr ie~?~ However, the assertion that a reporter's privilege is 
necessary in order to perform the press function has been re- 
jected by the United States Supreme Court in Branzburge7 and 
by the Ziiricher Obergericht in Strafkammer.e8 The West Ger- 
man courts, on the other hand, have been reluctant to reject the 
second argument. 
Two cases that were discussed earlier illustrate the West 
German position. First, in the Hamburg case the Bundesverfas- 
sungsgericht specifically denied the constitutional argument 
while invalidating a state-level reporter's privilege statute, but 
only after weighing the particular facts of the case.69 Second, in 
the Frankfurt decision the Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen re- 
65. For the claim of journalists' privilege in the United States see, e.g., Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 US.  665 (1972). In West Germany see, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 35; Frank- 
furt, supra note 42. In Switzerland see, e.g., Danuser, supra note 52; Zurich, supra note 
58. 
66. For the United States see generally Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 US.  532, 539 (1965). For West Germany see generally P. 
SCHNEIDER. PRESSE- UND MEINUNGSFREIHEIT NACH DEM GRUNDGESETZ 118-29 (1962). For 
Switzerland see generally P. SALADIN, GRUNDRECHTE IM WANDEL: DIE RECHTSPRECHUNG 
DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BU DESCERICHTS zu DEN GRUNDRECHTEN IN EINER SICH ANDERNDEN 
UMWELT 43-48 (1970). 
67. 408 US.  a t  698-99. Justice Powell's concurrence appears to  give more weight to 
the second premise than does Justice White's plurality opinion. The Court's handling of 
empirical evidence on the importance of reporter's privilege has also been criticized. See 
supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
68. Zurich, supra note 58, a t  320. The concept is also implied in Danuser, supra 
note 52. 
69. Hamburg, supra note 38, a t  317. 
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fused to apply the federal statute because the journalist had al- 
ready revealed some information about his source.70 However, 
the court held that under some circumstances a journalist may 
refuse further disclosure even when the federal statute is inap- 
pli~able.~' This limited privilege is arguably derived from the 
constitution. 
The reporter's privilege cases in West Germany demon- 
strate a friendliness toward the press not found in the United 
States and Switzerland. This difference cannot be explained by 
the history of the constitutional guarantees of free press in the 
three countries. The history of the press in all three countries is 
filled with struggles against government censorship and control. 
As the governments' awareness for the need of an informed pub- 
lic became more acute, and the efforts of the press to eliminate 
the shackles of government control correspondingly intensified, 
the three countries established constitutional guarantees of a 
free press.72 However, the free press provisions of the Swiss and 
United States constitutions and the West German Basic Law 
have had dissimilar effects on the reporter's privilege. 
In Switzerland and the United States the judiciary has in- 
terpreted the pertinent constitutional guarantees as requiring 
the government to remain neutral in matters dealing with the 
press.73 Despite a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the 
press, the press is granted no more rights or privileges than the 
average citizen, who is guaranteed freedom of expression. Free- 
dom of the press is only a subpart of freedom of speech and 
expression. Therefore, a journalist enjoys no more rights than a 
nonj~urnalist.~' 
70. Frankfurt, supra note 42; see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
71. Frankfurt, supra note 42; see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. For 
application of this concept see Advertisement, supra note 47. 
72. US. CONST. amend. I; B. VERF. art. 55 (Switz.); GG art. 5 (W. Ger.). The citation 
for the West German Basic Law is the new version, but varies little from the older ver- 
sions. For a brief history of the press, see, e.g., H. NELSON & D. TEETER. LAW OF MASS 
COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA 26-56 (4th ed. 
1982); M. L~FFLER & R. RICKER. HANDBUCH DES PRESSERECHT 20-28 (1978); C. LUDWIG, 
SCHWEIZERISCHE PR SSERECHT 63-81 (1964). One German commentator has noted that 
the government began compelling disclosure of sources and information once censorship 
was no longer allowed in order to retain some control over the press. In effect, the grant- 
ing of freedom of the press caused a need for reporter's privilege. H. M ~ H L ,  supra note 
26, a t  22-23. 
73. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 761 (1977); see 
also Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. 
CT. REV. 225, 226. 
74. Contra Meiklejohn, The Courts, the Press, and the Public: The Case of Myron 
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The West German Basic Law contains a provision that 
could justify a similar result. The Basic Law states that freedom 
of the press can be limited by general laws, i.e., laws that apply 
to all persons, and not just the press.'& This provision essentially 
gives the legislature constitutional authority to regulate the 
press to the same extent that i t  regulates the rest of society. 
Thus, there is constitutional authority for requiring the press to 
testify as long as the rest of society is also required to do so? 
Although journalists in the United States, West Germany, 
and Switzerland are all guaranteed the right to a free press by 
the constitution or Basic Law, that right can be regulated to the 
same extent the rest of society is regulated. However, in all three 
countries legislative power exists to grant special privileges. 
West Germany is the only country that has legislatively enacted 
a federal statutory privilege. There is nothing notably different 
about the West German concept of freedom of the press that 
explains this more liberal approach with the exception of a pos- 
sible government "friendliness" toward the press. 
B. The Philosophies of the Three Systems and the Effect of 
the ''Performance State" on the Reporter's Privilege 
Although freedom of the press exists in all three countries, 
the enactment of a federal statutory reporter's privilege in West 
Germany may reflect the more encompassing legal theory es- 
poused in that country. Scholars suggest that West Germany has 
developed into a "performance state" that not only formally ac- 
knowledges basic rights by not allowing government interference 
with those rights, but also places an affirmative duty on the 
state to implement programs to secure and protect those 
rights.77 In essence, the performance state extends the concept 
Farber and The New York Times, 30 SYRACUSE L REV. 789 (1979). 
75. GG art. 5 1 2 (W. Ger.). For explanation of "general law" see, e.g., R. GROSS, 
PRESSERECHT: EINFUHRUNG IN GRUNDZ~GE UND SCHWERPUNKTE DES DEUTSCHEN PRESSE- 
RECHTS 50-53 (1982); M. L~FFLER & R. RICKER, HANDBUCH DES PRESSERECHTS 51-53 
(1978). 
76. All three countries allow privileges to be granted to some groups, e.g. doctors 
and clergy, without requiring that the same privilege be given journalists. All three allow 
the press to also receive special treatment from the law, but that special treatment may 
not necessarily be derived from the constitutions or Basic Law. 
77. See Haberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat, 30 VEROEFFENTLICHUNCEN DER 
VEREIN~GUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER [VVDSTRL] 43 (1972) (Professor Dr. 
Peter Haberle was one of the instigators of the term "performance state"); see also 
Benda, New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, 11 J .  MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 1 (1977); Kommers, The Jurisprudence 
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of the welfare state beyond the obligation to distribute welfare 
benefits to the poor to include an affirmative duty to the entire 
legal system. 
One West German scholar has stated that in a performance 
state the "performance law" sets the profile of the social consti- 
tutional state and, without such a performance law, basic rights 
would be socially ineffective."' Merely granting freedom of the 
press and formally acknowledging that right offers the journalist 
little protection. However, the performance state brings about 
the maximal actualization of that right by enacting affirmative 
legislation, e.g., a statutory reporter's privilege. 
The reporter's privilege in West Germany is an example of a 
performance state carrying out its affirmative duty to protect 
rights. In contrast, in most areas of the law, the United States 
does little more than not interfere with basic rights.79 The emer- 
gence of a welfare or performance state in the United States or 
Switzerland may bring about changes in the reporter's privilege. 
West Germany has enacted a national statutory reporter's 
privilege that offers extensive protection from compelled disclos- 
ure. In the United States and Switzerland some of the states and 
cantons have enacted reporter's privilege statutes, but there is 
no uniform, nationally applicable law. There are no formal con- 
stitutional interpretations that explain this difference. I t  may re- 
sult from the different legal philosophies of the three nations, in- 
particular the concept of a performance state. Whatever the un- 
derlying differences of the three systems, the West German re- 
porter's privilege can serve as a model for a federal reporter's 
privilege statute in the United States and Switzerland. 
Jeff  V. Nelson 
of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 657, 673-77 (1980). 
78. Haberle, supra note 77, at 47. 
79. In the United States, the performance state concept has apparently only been 
extended in limited economic situations and some areas of civil rights. See generally A. 
MILLER. SOCIAL CHANCE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 
(Contributions in American Studies No. 41, 1979). 
